Battle of Bataan

The Battle of Bataan was the high point of Imperial Japan's invasion of the Philippines. By early 1942, with the capture of major US and British possessions in the Far East, and their land, air and naval forces in full retreat, the Japanese sought to destroy the last vestiges of Allied military supremacy in Asia.

Background

War Plan Orange-3

The concept of WPO-3 was to delay invading enemy forces until the US Pacific Fleet could be mustered at full strength and fight its way to the Philippines. At the Bataan peninsula, with its defensive terrain, and backed by artillery from the harbor defenses in Manila Bay and the nearby island fortress of Corregidor, the defenders were expected to hold out until reinforcements arrive. But with the Pacific Fleet, crippled at Pearl Harbor, no aid would be forthcoming.

Meanwhile, Manuel L. Quezon, the president of the Philippine Commonwealth, together with his family and staff were evacuated to Corregidor, as well as all USAFFE military personnel were removed from the major urban areas. On December 26, 1941 , Manila was declared an open city, and Japanese forces occupied it on January 2, 1942 .

Retreat and Hold

On January 6, at the first defensive line from Dinalupihan to Layac Junction, the only approach to Bataan, the 31st Infantry Regiment of Col. Charles A. Steel, the 71st Division led by Brig. Gen. Clyde A. Selleck and the 26th Cavalry stood fast against relentless artillery fire and assaults of the pursuing Imai Detachment. The Abucay-Mauban line, the USAFFE's main battle position was now in place, with equally defensive sectors, held by Maj. Gen. Jonathan M. Wainwright 's I Philippine Corps in the east and by the II Philippine Corps of Maj. Gen. George M. Parker in the west.

On January 9, the enemy under Lt. Gen. Susumu Morioka assaulted the eastern flank of the Abucay-Mauban line,and was repulsed by the 91st Division of Brig. Gen. Luther Stevens and Col. George S. Clark's 57th Infantry. Another attack on January 14 at the boundary of the 41st and 51st Divisions of Brig. Generals Vicente Lim and Albert M. Jones, aided by the 43rd and 23rd Infantry, stubbornly refused the enemy their left flank.The enemy advanced to the Salian River valley through a gap made by the 51st Infantry's withdrawal. But a patrol discovered the infiltration, and units of the 21st Division rushed to the valley, and repulsed the enemy after a savage encounter.

At another engagement farther to the west, a Japanese force surprised and routed the 53rd Infantry of Col. John R. Boatwright. This force also penetrated deep behind the Abucay-Mauban line along the Abo-Abo river valley. But their advance was held up by combined units of the 21st and 51st Divisions, the 31st Division of Brig. Gen. Clifford Bluemel,and Col. John H. Rodman's 92nd Infantry at the Bani-Guirol forest area. The 31st Infantry and the 45th Infantry,Philippine Scouts of Col. Thomas W. Doyle partially restored the abandoned line of the 51st Division.

On January 15, the reinforced 1st Regular Division of Brig. Gen. Fidel Segundo, defending the Morong sector came under heavy bombardment, but held the line. The enemy penetrated through a huge gap in the Silangan-Natib area, established a roadblock on Mauban ridge, threatening to cut off the division's rear. Repeated attacks by the 91st and 71st Divisions, and 92nd Infantry failed to dislodge the enemy. The enemy's infiltration tactics became more frequent. Previously,Gen. Parker's II Corps had prevented a similar encirclement at the Salian river battle, but the position of Gen. Wainwright's I Corps was deemed indefensible, and the Abucay-Mauban line had to be abandoned on January 24.

Battles of the Points and Pockets

The Japanese were getting desperate, and in an attempt to outflank I Corps and isolate the Service Command sector of Brig. Gen. Allan C. McBride, crack enemy marines were landed on the west coast of southern Bataan. Battles were fought ferociously at the Lapay-Longoskawayan points from January 23-29, at the Quinawan-Aglaloma points from January 22-February 8, and at the Silalim-Anyasan points from January 27-February 13. Out of the 2,000 enemy troops committed to these battles, only 34 wounded returned to their lines.

After the battle of the points, pockets and Trail 2, which were splendid victories by the USAFFE, the defenders dug in along the line, used the interlude in battle to train and to improve their positions. Food and medicine were urgently needed, but none was forthcoming. Meanwhile, the enemy withdrew to regroup and wait for reinforcements.

The Fall

The Japanese High Command reinforced Gen. Homma's 14th Imperial Army and toward the end of March, the enemy prepared for the final assault. On April 3, the entire Orion-Bagac line was subjected to incessant air and artillery bombardment, which turned the Mt. Samat stronghold into an inferno. Everywhere along the line, the defenders were driven back by masses of Japanese tanks and infantry. The enemy launched a drive into the center, penetrated into flanks held by the 22nd and 23rd Regiments of the 21st Division and by April 6, Mt. Samat was captured.

All along the battle front, units crumbled and straggled to the rear. Other units disappeared into the jungle, never to be heard from again. In the last two days of the defense of Bataan, the defending II Corps progressively disintegrated and collapsed. By April 8, the senior US commander on Bataan, Maj. Gen. Edward B. King , saw the futility of further resistance, and put forth proposals for capitulation.

The next morning , April 9, 1942, the weary, starving and emaciated American and Filipino defenders on the battle-swept Bataan peninsula surrendered.

Outcome and Historical Significance

See also